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Governing
PASSIONS
Big government versus small government was the 
argument of the 80s. Gavin Kendall and Gary Wickham 
argue that the argument is stale. More interesting is the 
question of how to govern, and what governing is.
n the last ten years or so, much has 
been written and spoken in Anglo- 
Saxon countries about the size and 
extent of government. Much effort 
has been spent arguing, or at least gesturing, over 
how small government needs to be to allow these 
English-speaking nations to stay ahead of, or just 
keep up with (depending on how realistic you 
are) Japanese and continental European  
economic performance. Most of this effort has 
been wasted because far too little of it has 
focused on answering the deceptive question: 
what is government?
Australian governments at state and federal level (of both 
major parties) seem obsessed with demonstrating (over 
and over) how lean they've become. The recent British
election was won by a Conservative government which 
convinced enough of the electorate that a commitment to 
small government—one might even say, a commitment to 
minimal levels of government—is crucial to Britain's fu­
ture prosperity. In this case, the small government theme 
won the day in the face of evidence that the policies as­
sociated with it have pushed Britain further and further 
behind its European and Japanese economic competitors. 
Clearly, we must acknowledge that the small government 
idea is resilient. But so what? Silly ideas are often resilient.
Our contention is that more careful thinking about the 
nature of government can push the 'big versus small' 
debate off the stage and open the way for more sensible 
consideration of the effectiveness of government. This is the 
situation in parts of continental Europe, at least. Debate 
there concentrates on the effectiveness of government, 
rather than on its ideal size (with the assumption that its 
effectiveness somehow magically follows from this); pos­
sibly this is one of the reasons for European economic
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success. We would contrast this with the situation in Anglo- 
Saxon countries, where battle-lines are often simply drawn 
UP for  and against government.
Let's go back to basics, then. A dictionary is of limited help; 
'government' is one of those words with such a wide array 
°f definitions lexicographers cannot pin it down. But at 
least it's a place to start. From among dictionary definitions 
three meanings of government demand attention: (i) the 
business of directing and controlling the actions, affairs, 
Policies and functions of organisations, localities, cities, 
regions, nation-states; (ii) the process of exercising restraint 
°ver something or somebody; (iii) the process of regulating 
the flow of energy to a particular mechanism (a meaning 
j^hich comes directly from 19th century mechanics, which 
knew a governor as a device to regulate the speed of a 
K^chine).
Now we're talking. Government is deliberate restraint, but 
not restraint for its own sake. Government is about directed 
restraint: restraint directed towards certain desired policy 
outcomes and away from certain perceived dangers, espe­
cially the ever-present danger of unrestrained energy. In 
line with this we can talk about a complex of government 
in which people govern themselves and are at the same time 
governed by others: by organisations, localities, cities and 
so on. Government in modern western countries, including 
Australia, is concerned with directed restraint, by citizens 
and over citizens.
All this captures the flavour of some writing on govern­
ment by the great Italian theorist of government, Niccolo 
Machiavelli. For Machiavelli, as we read him, government 
is about managing/ortuMA and managing the consequences
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of managing fortuna. The beauty of this formulation lies in 
its recognition of the perpetual character of government.
Life produces many, many situations which require 
directed restraint: food production, personal conduct or 
regional unemployment are just some examples. In ad­
dressing these situations by directed restraint, government 
produces new situations which require directed restraint. 
And so on ad infinitum. In this way government never 
totally succeeds and, as such, always produces the condi­
tions for its own necessity.
You do not need to be a great theorist to work this one out; 
just ask Paul Keating about governing the Richardson fias­
co, or Nick Greiner about governing the Metherell affair, or 
John Major about governing the poll tax issue. They will all 
tell you government produces problems in producing solu­
tions, which need more solutions, which produce more 
problems, and so on.
Before we make the picture more complex, consider the sad 
state of Australian and British manufacturing industry. 
Any decent factory manager knows that the business of 
manufacturing produces many, many problems which 
must be addressed if even a modicum of success is to be 
achieved. These problems mean the factory must be per­
petually governed. Shifts in demand, changes in plant 
technology, the whims of the trading policies of other na­
tions, the vagaries of suppliers, the necessity of skilled 
workers, all need solutions—and the solutions inevitably
produce new problems. There is no substitute for careful, 
detailed government. Many Australian and British factory 
managers and their employees are providing just such 
government at this level. Yet much of the energy of govern­
ment at municipal, regional and national levels above them 
is being directed not to supporting them with careful, 
detailed industry policies, but to poppycock policies about 
the angle of playing fields in line with a blinkered commit­
ment to small government.
This example illustrates the need for clear thinking about 
the nature of government. There is just too much evidence 
that municipal, regional and national Anglo-Saxon govern­
ments have lost sight of what government is about.
Perhaps, you may well say, we are being unfair. Surely 
these governments are trying to govern, even if they're not 
doing it very well? No, we don't think we're being unfair. 
We recognise that governments are trying to govern. Part 
of our argument is that it is their compulsion to govern 
which is getting in the way of their clear thinking about 
how they govern. The last two centuries have seen a mas­
sive rise in scope of the will to govern. Of course, govern­
ments have displayed a strong will to govern since ancient 
times. We are arguing that it is the scope of this will which 
has dramatically increased, and that this dramatic increase 
is a further obstacle to the clear thinking of governments 
which are not committed enough to the need for clear 
thinking in the first place.
The world of work is no longer so simple. 
Global forces and new technology are accelerating change. 
Unions are amalgamating. W om en are asserting their ability. 
Young people are assessing their options.
To find out what's happening (and what might happen next) politicians, 
people in the media and union leaders in Australia turn to Workplace, 
the bright new quarterly magazine from the ACTU. 
Workplace, where work takes first place.
Take out an annual Workplace subscription (4 issues) now by posting a cheque for $20 to:
Workplace - the ACTU magazine 
c/o 220 Clarendon Street 
East Melbourne 3002
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The French thinker Michel Foucault refers to this dramatic 
increase in the scope of the will to govern by the neologism 
'governmentality'. By 'governmentality' Foucault is refer­
ring not only to the increase in the number of things that 
governments above the level of municipal management 
have concerned themselves with since the middle of the 
18th century and the accompanying increase in the size and 
sophistication of public bureaucracies (something many 
important thinkers, especially Max Weber, have pointed to 
and tried to describe). Rather, he is mainly referring to a 
unique configuration of events and inventions behind 
these increases. It is the uniqueness of this configuration of 
events and inventions which is important. Any one of 
them, taken separately, can be traced back well beyond the 
18th century, but they only came together as the package 
Foucault calls governmentality at around this time.
We think five events and inventions are central to 
Foucault's account. The first is the consolidation of a series 
of doctrines around 'reason of state'. These doctrines 
(which began to emerge in the 16th century) understood 
the operation of the state in terms of principles which were 
internal to the state itself. These doctrines meant the work­
ings of government could be considered in terms of the 
internal organisation of the state, rather than, say, in terms 
of the will of God.
Second, the development of the notion of population as part 
of the art of government. The reason of state development 
meant that the art of government had something to tackle; 
there was a lot more to be artful about. Government came 
to be a means to an end in regard to population. This notion 
quickly came to be the focus of concerns about health, 
wealth, happiness, longevity and so on. What or who is it 
that should be healthy, wealthy, happy, long-lived, or 
whatever? A general answer was needed for the general 
government which was emerging (to avoid it fracturing 
into very specific governmental units, like families, with 
no government beyond these units)— and population was 
that answer. The question to be addressed was how to 
guarantee the good condition of the population.
Third, the rise of the new science of political economy. The 
new regularity of population could no longer be under­
stood, as we hinted above, solely through the economy of 
the family (the traditional model of economic life of the 
early modern period); the new political economy replaced 
this old economy. The family was still an important instru­
ment of government, but it was now secondary to the 
master concept of population. The new political economy 
sought to promote the flow of government between in­
dividuals, family and state. Part and parcel of this develop­
ment was the development of the science of police—better 
understood in 20th century English as 'policy ' or 
'welfare'—which dealt with the flow of government be­
tween state and individual, taking the family as its instru­
ment rather than its model.
Fourth, the emergence of the practical political doctrine of 
liberalism, especially as it allowed the transformation from 
disciplinary societies to societies where liberty is potential­
ly guaranteed through security. In line with this, govern­
ment was reorganised around new modes of managing 
risks—sometimes called insurantial technologies (which 
now of course include the welfare state). Liberalism 
enabled the conception and formulation of welfare 
policies. Its aim was to amplify the capacities of the citizen 
body, to replace the more overtly 'disciplinary' techniques 
of the earlier era of absolutist rule.
Finally, the birth of the human sciences as formal 
governmental knowledges. Over the course of a hundred 
years or so economics, sociology, and psychology began to 
make their contributions to government, providing ac­
counts of what the increasingly various elements of 
population look like and how they behave and are likely 
to behave. Parallel to these sciences, and perhaps more 
important than them all, the science of statistics expanded 
rapidly. Sets of facts about the state were reformulated as 
very specific understandings (increasingly numerically ex­
pressed understandings) of populations, allowing more 
and more precise calculations about birth, mortality, mor­
bidity, longevity, health, illness, suicide and so on, almost 
ad infinitum.
‘An idealistic belief in 
cutting down government is 
not good enough. ’
Government in the modern world is complex; there is no 
way round this fact. What we are urging on those directly 
involved in government at municipal level and above is 
that the complexities can be unravelled, described and 
sensibly addressed. Governm ent requires careful, 
painstaking work. No amount of blustering about small 
government or large government, private enterprise or 
socialist government is going to obviate this need. Dogma 
needs to be replaced by an analysis which starts from the 
conviction that the art and activity of government are 
complex: we are arguing that an idealistic belief in the 
possibility of cutting down on government is just not good 
enough.
European and Japanese governments are much more 
aware of this than their Anglo-Saxon counterparts, as we 
noted above. They waste a lot less of their personnel's time 
and energy on ideological bluster. If we in the English- 
speaking world want to catch up to their economic perfor­
mance, we must start thinking about the importance of 
government in new ways. We cannot luxuriate in the will 
to govern without thinking through what government 
means.
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